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Introduction
The new agenda for the trade negotiations focuses on reducing agricultural
support and protection in the areas of market access (tariffs and tariff-rate quotas), export
competition (export subsidies), and domestic support (production subsidies and other
trade-distorting support). The next round of trade negotiations launched in Doha, Qatar,
in November 2001 put in place new conditions for the World Trade Organization (WTO)
member countries.  Agriculture in the United States enters these negotiations with
commodity programs governed by the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002
(2002 Farm Act).  This paper analyzes the distributional impacts of U.S. commodity
programs involving price-contingent and lump-sum payments on U.S. farm and non-farm
households. The analysis uses a highly disaggregated U.S. Computable General
Equilibrium (CGE) model.  In the model, farm household impacts occur through program
effects on farm household income as well as farm sector output and commodity prices.
Non-farm household impacts occur through taxes and the cost of food.
Farm households that receive commodity payments have striking differences in
sales class, wealth, and dependence on off-farm income.  The Economic Research
Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA-ERS) developed a typology that
distinguishes farm households by these characteristics.  We embodied this typology into a
U.S. CGE model to capture some of the heterogeneity across farm households in
responses and in outcomes generated by the commodity programs. Farm household
responses have not been used as an indicator of policy effects.  Typically, policy affects
on commodity markets –prices, production, and trade- have been addressed with CGE
models. Although traditional CGE models allow some heterogeneity in how relative price
effects are felt across sectors, most models capture the effects of policy through a single
representative household, and ignore how households decide to engage in labor markets,
allocate income to current consumption or savings for farm and non-farm investments.
Given the detailed structure of the CGE model, with its inclusion of non-farm and
farm households distinguished by the USDA-ERS farm household typology, we simulate
the  distributional effects from current U.S. farm policy relative to no policy under
unilateral liberalization.  Farm commodity programs under the 2002 Farm Act are
expected to distribute to farm households an annual average $11 billion per year for the
next five years to farm households. Our analysis explores the distributional impact from
direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, and marketing assistance loans.  A key issue
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for measuring the distributional impact is whether the programs are modeled as a lump-
sum transfer (decoupled) or a market distorting subsidy (coupled).  Direct payments are
decoupled and marketing assistance loans are coupled.  Counter-cyclical payments are
treated as  decoupled in one scenario and coupled in another scenario.  Our analysis
examines the sensitivity of the  distributional impacts to the alternative treatments of
counter-cyclical payments.
The 2002 Farm Act is also expected to have distributional effects among farm
households and non-farm households.  Mid- and high-income non-farm households pay
the taxes that finance the government payments.  Taxes impose a burden on the taxpayer
that leads to a welfare cost. To the extent that farm programs reduce farm prices and the
lower commodity prices are passed onto consumers as lower food prices, non-farm
households benefit.  We assess the distributional impacts from program payments to farm
households, from lower food costs to all households, and from tax payments and the
efficiency cost of taxes to mid- and high-income households.
Background and Method of Analysis
The analysis uses a U.S. CGE model developed and maintained at USDA-ERS.
The model supports comparative static analysis, and is rich in detailed specification of
industry, labor, and households to allow for the distributional analysis.  This section
describes the model, farm commodity programs, and farm households.
U.S. CGE Model
A CGE model is an economy-wide computer simulation model that captures the
economic interactions among households, producers, and government.  Each of these
economic entities has multiple roles and each interacts with all other entities.  Households
supply labor to production and consume goods and services using the income they have
earned.  In addition, they receive income from the ownership of capital, receive
government transfer payments, save, and pay taxes.  Producers make goods and services
for the market, and use labor inputs as well as capital stocks and other goods.  The
government collects tax revenue and provides transfers and various public services to
households.
Each of the economic entities in the model may be aggregated at different levels
of detail, refining the model's specification and making it relevant for specific policy
issues.  We aggregate producers by industry groups using the Input-Output Accounts
(U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis).  The industry groups are
chosen to emphasize the role of agriculture and food processing in the U.S. Economy.
We use a model with 59 sectors, of which 10 are farm sectors and 12 are food processing.
Trade and transportation are also treated explicitly so that household consumption3
behavior responds to the retail price, while production decisions respond to the producer
price.  Even with this high level of industry detail, the farm sectors combine some
commodities, such as wheat with rice in “food grains” and corn with hay in “feed grains,”
that would ideally be treated separately.
Households are grouped to focus on the impact of farm commodity programs on
farm and non-farm households.  The treatment of farm households will be discussed in
more detail below.  Non-farm households are distinguished by income (high and low) and
low-income households are further distinguished by whether or not they participate in the
Food Stamp Program.  Households are segmented into these social-economic categories
using data from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Agricultural and Resource
Management Survey (ARMS).
2
Households receive income from three main sources: earnings both from wages
and salaries and from self-employment; capital income from the ownership of assets–
dividends, interest, and rent; and transfer income from government programs.  In addition
to a number of government transfer programs for low-income and elderly households
(such as food stamps and Social Security), we include three farm commodity programs
(direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, and loan deficiency payments).  Separate
consideration is given to the farm rents paid to non-farm households (non-operator
landlords).  Households use their income to consume goods and services, pay taxes, and
save.  Household expenditure shares, tax rates and savings rates are derived from survey
data and may differ among household types.
3
Labor supply and demand is also treated in detail.  The primary and secondary
earner of each household type supplies labor in an earner specific mix of occupations
distinguished by skill (education and training) categories.  Only farm households supply
“farm operator” as an occupation, but farm households also supply labor to off-farm
occupations.  Similarly, each industry demands labor in its own unique mix of
occupations.
4  The mix of occupations supplied by households and demanded by firms
can adjust in response to changes in relative wages.  For households this occurs through a
Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function.  For firms this occurs through a
nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production system.
Households are modeled as agents that maximize utility, a measure of their well-
being, through the purchase of an array of goods and services and the enjoyment of
leisure, as each faces a budget constraint and a constraint on the total amount of time
allocated to work or leisure.  A Linear Expenditure System, extended to include leisure,
is used to derive household commodity demand and labor supply.  Commodity price and
income elasticity values are specified using estimates by  Blanchiforti et al. (1986),
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Blundell et al. (1993), and Park et al. (1996) as guidance.  Parameters central to the
analysis are the price and income elasticities for food demand.  The price elasticity ranges
from –0.13 to –0.16, while the income elasticity ranges from 0.33 to 0.36 among the
household types. The net wage and income elasticity values for labor supply are also
important.  There is a large empirical literature on labor supply elasticity values, which
we discuss below in context of the social cost of taxes.  For our analysis, the secondary
earner or spouse is more responsive to income and wage changes, while the primary
earner has very little response.  We assume an income elasticity of –0.025 for the primary
earner and –0.2 for the secondary earner, as well as a compensated elasticity of 0.075 for
the primary earner and 0.6 for the secondary earner (Hanson et al. 2002).
Firms maximize profits from the sale of goods and services to households, given
their technology of production.  I ntermediate goods are used in fixed proportion to
production, while primary factor substitution in production is characterized with a CES
value-added production function.  For aggregate labor, capital, and land, the elasticity of
substitution is set slightly greater than one for manufacturing and slightly less than one
for services and agriculture, based on Balisteri, et al. (2001) where they find that a Cobb-
Douglas specification (with an elasticity of substitution equal to one) is a reasonable
starting point.
5 Aggregate labor is a CES function of labor by occupation with an
elasticity of substitution of one-half.
For the crop sectors, we use a CET land allocation function to model the
allocation of land among crops in response to commodity price changes.  Historically, the
production response of agricultural crops has been inelastic, and we calibrate the model
response accordingly using a CET land elasticity of 0.7 (Lin et al. 2000).
The treatments of aggregate supplies for land, labor, and capital are important
features of a CGE model, influencing how the model’s outcomes respond to a policy
shock.  The aggregate supply of land for agriculture is fixed.  Labor supply, in terms of
more or less hours worked by occupation, is an endogenous outcome of household
decisions.  In the short-run, the aggregate stock of capital is fixed, but it can be
reallocated among sectors of production.  In the long-run, aggregate capital stock adjust
to maintain the rate of return to capital at its original level.
The CGE model incorporates imperfect substitution between imports and
domestic goods using the Armington assumption.  Domestic demand is for a composite
commodity of imports and domestically produced goods combined by a CES aggregation
function.  There is a parallel treatment of export supply, with each sector producing a
composite commodity that can be transformed into an export or a commodity sold on the
domestic market with a CET function.  Imports and exports are generally taken to be
elastic in response to price changes (McDaniel and Balistreri 2002, Gallaway et al. 2000).
We use an export price elasticity of 2, and an import price elasticity of 1.5.
We complete the specification of the CGE model by adding the accounts for three
other economic entities: government, Rest of World (ROW), and capital account.  Model
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closure determines how the government, ROW, and capital accounts adjust to maintain
an accounting identity, in response to changes in economic activity (Robinson 1989,
Arora and Dua 1993). Closure for the government summarizes the outcome of a political
process.  For the trade balance, closure summarizes the complex process by which the
balance of trade, exchange rate, and foreign capital income flows adjust.  Similarly, for
the savings-investment balance, closure summarizes a complex system of financial
transactions whose net result is the allocation of financial savings into physical
investment for equipment and structures.  In none of these cases is there an explicit set of
behavioral equations attempting to describe the outcome of these complex market and
political processes.  Instead, it has proven expedient to introduce certain closure rules for
these major aggregate balances.
The government collects taxes, purchases goods and services from firms in
different industries, and disburses transfers to households and producers. Taxes include
personal income tax, corporate profit tax on capital income, social security tax on labor
income, a business tax on sales, and tariffs on imports. Transfers from government
include those to low-income and elderly households, as well as farm commodity
programs.  For the government account, the closure identity is that revenue less
expenditure equals the surplus (deficit if negative).  The closure rule used in our analysis
is to fix real government expenditures and the government deficit at base levels, and let
personal income tax rates adjust.
The treatment of ROW as one actor rather than many countries is a standard
simplification for single country models that we maintain in our CGE model.  The ROW
supplies imports to the United States and purchases exports from the United States.  For
the ROW account, the closure identity is a balance-of-trade constraint in which the value
of imports at world prices must equal the value of exports at world prices plus a number
of capital income flows.  These include net foreign investment, net foreign factor income
payments, net foreign remittances, interest payments to foreigners on the U.S.
government debt, and foreign transfers by the U.S. government.  The closure rule used in
our analysis is to fix the trade balance at the base level, and let the exchange rate adjust,
which affects the price paid for imports and the revenue earned from exports.
The capital account describes the market for loanable funds. Sources of savings
are households, businesses, government surplus or deficit, and net capital inflows from
the ROW.  Business savings are from depreciation of capital stocks and retained
earnings.  Investment is divided between changes in inventory and fixed investment, or
the purchase of new capital stocks by industry and government produced through the
purchase of equipment and construction services. For the capital account, the closure
identity is that savings equal investment.  The closure rule used in our analysis is to fix
real investment at the base level, and let household savings rates adjust.
In summary, the closure rules direct the impact of a policy change to take the
form of a change in household real income rather than changes in the trade balance, real
investment, and the government deficit.  These closure rules allow the model to produce a
measure of change to household well-being.6
A CGE model solves for market price relative to a fixed price index, or
numeraire.  There is a choice among a number of price indices to fix.  For policy
applications we generally fix a domestic price index. The fixed  numeraire forces the
weighted-average price change across commodities to balance out: if domestic prices fall
for some goods they will rise for other goods.  Although switching  numeraire may
influence how price changes are transmitted in the modeled economy, the final impact as
measured by the change in household real income remains the same.
A CGE model traces the impacts from a “shock,” such as a change in policy,
through the economy and its inter-linked entities.  Simulating the impacts of a policy
change in our CGE model is an exercise in comparative static analysis, a what-if
comparison of two equilibrium states of the economy.  The results of comparative static
analysis are changes in economic activity when the economy has completed a move from
a base equilibrium associated with existing policies to a new equilibrium as a result of a
policy change.  In the actual economy, such changes occur over time, the economy does
not adjust to a new equilibrium instantaneously.  A CGE model describes and compares
the old and new equilibrium but not the adjustment process. Analysis with a CGE model
is “not strictly to predict the future but to facilitate a systematic exploration of … critical
events” (Granger 1989: 224).  The model provides a laboratory for gaining insight into
the economic impacts from a policy change.  It does give a quantitative result, but not a
time-dependent dynamic path of adjustment.
One contribution of a CGE model is its comprehensive look at the impact of
policy change on the economy, taking into account the various linkages among the
economic entities.  In the case of farm commodity programs, a policy change of interest
is the removal of the programs and the relative impacts of removing coupled payments or
alternatively  decoupled payments.  The initial impact is a reduction in government
transfers to farm households, removal of a price distortion for program commodities, and
a decrease in the personal income tax rate to maintain a budget neutral policy change.
Farm households respond to a change in income and relative prices for program
commodities with changes in labor supply and production.  Taxpayers adjust their labor
supply.  Each direct effect of a policy change creates its own set of ripple effects,
captured by the CGE model.  An indirect effect of interest is the impact of changes in
farm commodity prices on food prices and the cost of food consumption.  The three
distributional impacts from farm commodity programs are transfers from government to
farm households, taxes paid by households, and cost of household food purchases.  This
paper traces out these three impacts and compares them under alternative scenarios of
whether counter-cyclical payments are coupled or decoupled payments.
6
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Farm Commodity Programs
The 2002 Farm Act governs agricultural programs through 2007.  Title I of the
Act  reauthorizes and amends commodity support programs administered by the U.S.
Department of Agriculture (USDA-ERS, Farm and Commodity Policy Briefing Room).
For our analysis, we focus on the distributional impacts of three key programs under this
title; direct payments, counter-cyclical payments, and marketing assistance loans.  These
three programs provide income support for wheat, feed grains, upland cotton, rice,
oilseeds, and peanuts.  Our analysis does not account for the sugar or dairy commodity
programs, nor does it account for conservation, trade, and crop insurance programs.
Table 1 presents preliminary USDA-ERS projections for the average annual
expenditures for the three farm commodity programs.  The projections are made in
relation to the Agricultural Baseline (USDA-ERS, Baseline Projections Briefing Room).
Total annual average subsidies are $11.2 billion, with $4.9 billion as direct payments,
$4.6 billion as counter-cyclical payments, and $1.7 billion as loan deficiency payments.
In this paper, we investigate the distributional impacts from these projected average
annual program expenditures.
The commodity programs governed by the 2002 Farm Act are comparable with
those governed by the 1996 farm act.  Direct payments replace the production flexibility
contracts (PFC), maintaining annual average expenditures at a similar average level.
These programs are decoupled in that payments do not depend on current market prices
or current farm production, rather they depend on historical acreage and historical yields.
For the WTO, direct payments are like PFC that meet the criteria of the green box.
The 2002 Farm Act continues the commodity loan program with marketing loan
provisions.  Loan deficiency payments and marketing loan gains occur when market
prices are lower than commodity loan rates.  During 1998-2001 market prices were
exceptionally low and annual average expenditures were $6.2 billion by our calculations.
Preliminary projections over 2003-06 for annual average loan deficiency payments are
$1.7 billion.  Higher market prices are projected to reduce program payments (USDA-
ERS, Agricultural Baseline Briefing Room).  Since the payment a farmer receives
depends on current production and current market price, the program is coupled and
directly influences farm production decisions. For the WTO, loan deficiency payments
meet the criteria of the amber box.
Counter-cyclical payments to producers are meant to offset low market prices.
The program is designed to avoid emergency assistance under adverse market conditions.
It provides benefits to producers of grains, oilseeds, and cotton whenever the effective
price for the commodity is less than its target price. The payment rate is the target price
less the direct payment rate, both specified in the 2002 Farm Act, less the higher of the
commodity price or loan rate.  The program payment is the payment rate times payment
acres and payment yield, where both acres and yield depend on historical data and not
current farm production (USDA-ERS, Farm and Commodity Policy Briefing Room).8
Counter-cyclical payments depend on current market prices but they do not
directly depend on current production.  Indirectly, current production influences market
prices, and expected prices influence current production. So, the coupled-decoupled
treatment of this program is not as straightforward as for the other two commodity
programs (Westcott, Young, and Price 2002).  Do counter-cyclical payments influence
farm production decisions?  The distributional impact of the farm commodity programs
depends on the market-distorting influence of the programs.  For our analysis, we
experiment with both treatments.
With counter-cyclical payments dependent on market prices, projected annual
average expenditures depend on projections of U.S. and world agricultural conditions.
Under the USDA-ERS Agricultural Baseline, preliminary projections for annual average
counter-cyclical payments are $4.6 billion over 2003-06.  This is less than our estimate of
$5.9 billion annual average expenditure on the same commodities through emergency
assistance over 1998-01 period.
The farm commodity programs governed by the 2002 Farm Act are introduced
into the U.S. CGE model as either production distorting subsidies by commodity or as
lump-sum transfers to farm households.  Direct payments are lump-sum transfers, while
loan deficiency payments are production distorting subsidies.  Counter-cyclical payments
are treated as a lump-sum transfer in scenario-1 and as a production distorting subsidy in
scenario-2.  The annual average expenditure on production distorting subsidies amount to
$1.7 billion in scenario-1 and $6.3 billion in scenario-2, while lump-sum transfers
amount to $9.5 billion in scenario-1 and $4.9 billion in scenario-2.  The relative
importance of production-distorting subsidies to lump-sum transfers in the distributional
impact of farm programs will be illustrated with these two scenarios.
In the CGE model, lump-sum transfers are distributed among farm household
types in proportion to ARMS data on program payments.  Through rents paid to non-
operator landlords, some of these payments end up as income to non-farm households.
Though these transfers do not directly distort production decisions by farmers, they do
influence farm household behavior.  Income transfers influence labor supply decisions of
on- and off-farm work by both the operator and spouse.
7  Production-distorting subsidies
are commodity specific and directly linked to current production of the program
commodities by the different farm household types.  They distort the marginal conditions
for the production of program commodities and influence the level of production and
labor demand to the production of these commodities.  These subsidies are introduced
into the CGE model as a price wedge to the production of program commodities and
added to the returns to land in production.  The distribution of these subsidies among
farm households is in proportion to their production of the program commodities.
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Farm households
Offutt (2002) emphasized the importance of assessing farm household impacts
from farm programs in her Presidential Address to the American Agricultural Economics
Association.  Farm households in the U.S. CGE model are disaggregated according to the
USDA-ERS farm typology.  The Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS)
provides the data to account for the farm and non-farm activities of the different farm
household types (USDA-ERS, ARMS Briefing Room). USDA-ERS (2001, 2002) provide
a comprehensive description of farm households in the farm typology (USDA-ERS, Farm
Income and Costs Briefing Room, farm household income).
The USDA-ERS farm typology disaggregates farm households by various
characteristics.  In addition to four sales classes, farm households are distinguished by
whether they have limited resources (farm assets less than a given value), whether the
operator is retired, and whether the operator reports a non-farming occupation as their
primary occupation.  From these characteristics, 7 types of farm households are
distinguished in the detailed ERS farm typology.  Table 2 presents the distribution of
farm households among these seven types, along with data for their on- and off-farm
sources of income.  Whereas 43.4 percent of farm households have a residential lifestyle
(primary occupation of operator is other than farming), they only account for 8.4 percent
of gross cash receipts.  Very large family farms (sales of $500,000 or more) receive 40.4
percent of gross cash receipts, while only accounting for 2.7 percent of farms.
Off-farm income is a significant share of farm household income, accounting for
83.3 percent of household income for all farm households (Table 2).  The importance of
off-farm income varies from 17.2 percent for the very large family farms to 110.5 percent
for limited-resource farms that receive negative self-employed farm income on average.
Earnings (wages and salaries plus off-farm business income) are the largest share of off-
farm income, though income from public programs such as Social Security are not
insignificant for some farm households.
Table 3 summarizes ARMS data on the distribution of government program
payments received by the farm household types. The larger farms receive a larger percent
of the farm commodity program payments since payments depend on current or historical
levels of production.  The share of farm program payments in each farm household’s
gross cash receipts from farming ranges from 6 percent for the very large family farms to
around 10 to 13 percent for the other types of farm households (from unreported data
underlying Tables 2 and 3).  So, even though government program payments go largely
to larger farms, the payments are a smaller share of gross cash receipts for larger farms.
Tables 4 and 5 provide information on the distribution of farm production by
product category and farm household type.  Table 4 illustrates the farm household share
of production for each product category.  For the grains and oilseed crops, that is the
program commodities, the very large family farms produce a lower percent (23 to 25
percent) of the crop than they do for most other product categories.  Table 5 presents the10
product share for each farm household type.  Feed grains and livestock are large shares
for all farm household types.
Table 6 presents data from ARMS for on-farm and off-farm work by the operator
and spouse for each farm household type. Farm households engage in Full- and part-time
work, both on- and off-farm. ARMS data on labor supply needs to be combined with
empirical estimates of how the operator and spouse adjust their on- and off-farm labor
supply in response to changes in farm self-employed income, off-farm wages, and
income transfers.  In a survey of farm household models, Huffman (1991) reports wage
elasticity values for the operator ranging from 0.06 to 0.4.  We hope that future empirical
analysis of ARMS data will provide new estimates for both the operator and spouse in a
joint decision (Ahearn, El-Osta, and Dewbre 2002, Dewbre and Mishra 2002, Mishra and
Holthausen 2002, USDA-ERS 2003). An important component of this work is imputing a
wage to the operator and spouse for on- and off-farm work (Whitener and Parker 1992,
El-Osta and Ahearn 1996).
Farm rent paid to non-operator landlords is an additional income flow important
for our distributional analysis of farm commodity programs.  Data on the rent paid to
non-operator landlords by commodity are available in the Input-Output Accounts
underlying the CGE.  Similar data by farm household type are available in ARMS.  At
this time, we have not reconciled the rent paid data from these two sources, and have
relied on the data in the Input-Output Accounts to specify the rent paid to non-operator
landlords (non-farm household) by commodity.  The rent payment amounted to $18.3
billion in 1997 (about 24 percent of non-labor income to the farm sector).  Given that
market distorting subsidies are treated as a return to land, the same proportion of them are
distributed to non-farm households through this distribution of rents.  Lump-sum
transfers to farm households are also partially distributed to non-farm households in
proportion to the distribution of rent paid to non-operator landlords.
Accounting for the farm and off-farm sources of income received by the different
farm household types is important for the appropriate characterization of households in
the CGE model.  We accomplish this by combining the 1999 ARMS data on farm
households with other micro survey data on non-farm households into the Social
Accounting Matrix (SAM) database underlying the CGE model.  In using the 1999
ARMS data, the farm commodity programs covered by the survey are those governed by
the 1996 Farm Act.  These are different from but similar to the programs governed by the
2002 Farm Act.  Until we are able to access the newer ARMS data, the 1996 program
data will be used to distribute the 2002 programs among the farm households.  Future
research may improve specification of the on- and off-farm labor supply and wages for
both the operator and spouse, and the specification of expenditure shares (particularly
food and housing), tax rates and saving rates of farm households.11
Social Costs of Taxes
The social cost of funds for the farm commodity programs equals the taxes paid
plus an additional amount -excess burden or cost of reduced economic efficiency- due to
the distorting impact of taxes and transfers on economic decisions.  Our analysis of the
distributional impact of farm commodity programs includes the impact of taxes to fund
the program and the excess burden from the taxes.  We use balanced budget analysis
when measuring the efficiency cost of funds for the farm programs, where the efficiency
cost is measured for an increase in taxes to fund a transfer program.  Because farm
commodity programs influence farm household labor supply and saving decisions as well
as the relative price of commodities, the efficiency cost of taxation is not separable from
the use of the funds and the impact they have on farm households and commodity prices.
We assume the funds for the farm commodity programs are from the personal
income tax, which distort the work-leisure and save-consume decisions by households.
8
Taxes introduce a wedge between the gross wage a household earns and the net wage
they receive.  The impact of the tax wedge on a household’s labor supply depends on the
labor supply elasticity values, and is the basis for the excess burden of taxation.  The
labor supply elasticity values we use are discussed below.
From a review of the literature on excess burden of taxation, we find a range of 10
to 30 percent reasonable.  This range is similar to a 10 to 25 percent range in Alston and
James (2002), as used by Gardner (2002).  Our range is lower than the 20 to 50 percent
range suggested in Alston and Hurd (1990) and cited in Moschini and Sckokai (1994).
More recent excess burden estimates from the 1990’s use lower labor supply elasticity
values than older estimates from the 1980’s.
Other factors besides the labor supply elasticities influence the estimated excess
burden.  One factor is the tax used to fund a program and the magnitude of its marginal
tax rate. Most studies use a marginal tax rate of around 40 percent on labor income
(Ballard 1988).  In our analysis the marginal tax rate on labor income for mid- and high-
income households is 34.5 percent and equals the sum of the personal income tax rate and
labor income tax rate.  Browning (1987) compares the impact of different marginal tax
rate under a common set of elasticity values, for two alternative uses of the funds.  When
the funds are used by the government to purchase goods and services such as national
defense, an increase in the marginal tax rate from 43 percent to 48 percent (12 percent
increase), increases the excess burden from 21.2 percent to 25.9 percent (22 percent
increase).  When the funds are redistributed back to households, then a 12 percent higher
tax rate leads to a 30 percent larger excess burden (from 27 percent to 35 percent).
How the funds from the tax are used has a bearing on the resulting excess burden.
In some studies the funds are used to purchase goods and services such as national
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defense, which are assumed to be separable in how they enter household utility. This
separability assumption allows the excess burden of taxation to be determined
independently of how the funds are used, because government expenditures are assumed
to not affect relative prices for commodities nor affect household labor supply decisions.
Another use of funds is to redistribute them back to households.  A universal
transfer redistributes the funds to each household as a lump-sum transfer. Such a transfer
is wasteful in that the same households that are taxed receive the transfer, which leads to
larger estimates for the excess burden than for other uses of funds.  Browning (1987)
finds that the excess burden increases from 21.2 percent when the funds are used for a
separable government purchase to 27 percent for universal redistribution, under a
common set of assumptions about the marginal tax rate and labor supply elasticity values.
A notched transfer is another form of redistribution in which some households are
taxed while other households receive the transfer, such as the U.S. social welfare system
for low-income households.  Ballard (1988) illustrates how the notched transfer reduces
the excess burden to 17.7 percent compared to an excess burden of 80 percent for a
universal transfer, under a common set of assumptions about the marginal tax rate and
labor supply elasticity values.   Ballard (1997, 1999) and Ballard and Goddeeris (1999)
suggest that labor supply elasticity values lower than those used in Ballard (1988) are
appropriate, which result in an excess burden of 27.5 percent for the universal transfer.
Comparable revisions to the notched transfer program have not been made.
Both the universal and notched transfer programs influence household labor
supply decisions, so the excess burden from taxation cannot be estimated separately from
the use of the funds.  Similarly, if the publicly funded project affects relative prices of
commodities, then the tax and spending policy of the government are non-separable, and
the project has an impact on the excess burden of taxation (Ballard and Fullerton 1992),
Ahmed and Croushore 1996).  In this situation, the excess burden of taxation is project
dependent.  An example is the financing of health care (Ballard and Goddeeris 1999).
Farm commodity programs are a mix of universal and notched transfers in that
not all farm households receiving the transfers pay a personal income tax.
9  Both
decoupled and coupled farm commodity programs influence farm household labor supply
decisions. Coupled programs also distort commodity prices.  Consequently, the excess
burden of taxation used to fund these programs depends on the impact of the programs.
Household Labor Supply Elasticity
A change in the personal income tax rate affects the wage rate net of the tax rate,
which influence household labor supply. The magnitude of the impact of a change in the
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personal income taxes is a project proposal under consideration at USDA-ERS.  In 1998, 75 percent of all
farm sole proprietors paid federal income tax, and 62 percent with business receipts greater than $100,000.13
net wage on household labor supply can be summarized by the household’s labor supply
elasticities.   A change in the net wage rate makes each hour of labor more or less
remunerative, and the household’s response can be divided into two components.  In
response to a higher net wage, households tend to supply more labor.  A component that
is called the compensated wage elasticity.  A change in the net wage also results in higher
or lower total earnings for the same amount of time worked.  Households tend to respond
to higher total earnings by reducing labor supply, a negative component that is called the
income elasticity.  The households total response to a net wage change is the sum of the
compensated wage and the income elasticity, and is called the uncompensated wage
elasticity.  It can be positive or negative, depending on whether the compensated wage
elasticity or the income elasticity is larger. The sign of the uncompensated wage elasticity
is an empirical issue.
There is a large literature on labor supply elasticity estimates.  The estimates
apply to single adults distinguished by sex, couples, participants in government programs
for low-income households, and the affluent
10.  A general finding is that labor supply is
both wage and income inelastic, though exceptions exist.  Furthermore, the secondary
earner or spouse is more responsive to income and wage changes than the primary earner,
who has very little response.
One general summary for all labor is an uncompensated labor supply elasticity of
0.05, compensated labor supply elasticity of 0.2, and income elasticity of –0.15 (Ballard
1997).  Ballard (1997,1999) specifies a set of elasticity values for men, women and
couples that are consistent with these overall elasticity values.  The income elasticity is
–0.15 for all groups, while the uncompensated labor supply elasticity is –0.05 for men
(making men’s labor supply negatively sloped or “backward bending”), 0.2 for women,
and 0.1 for couples.  These elasticity values are lower, implying less labor supply
response to a tax change, than used in earlier tax policy analysis (Ballard 1985, 1988).
For instance, Ballard (1988) assumes an income elasticity of -0.2 for all labor, a
weighted-average uncompensated labor supply elasticity of 0.16, and a compensated
labor supply elasticity of 0.36.  The lower central-case elasticity values lead to lower
estimates of the excess burden from taxation (Ballard 1996, 1988).
The U.S. Congressional Budget Office (1996) also summarizes labor supply
elasticity estimates in context of their use for tax policy analysis.  The elasticity values
represent the combined response of average hours by those working and the participation
decision.  For all people, the total wage elasticity or uncompensated labor supply
elasticity is 0 to 0.3, the income elasticity is –0.2 to –0.1, and the compensated elasticity
is 0.2 to 0.4. They consider single women similar in response to men, with a total wage
elasticity of –0.1 to 0.2, an income elasticity of –0.1 to 0, and a substitution elasticity of
0.1 to 0.2.  For married women, they summarize the total wage elasticity at 0.3 to 0.7, the
income elasticity at –0.3 to –0.2, and the substitution elasticity at 0.6 to 0.9.
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In our CGE analysis, we use labor supply elasticity values that fall in the range of
the US CBO (1996) summary values and are close to the central-case values suggested by
Ballard.  For all households in our analysis, including farm households, we assume an
income elasticity of –0.025 for the primary earner and –0.2 for the secondary earner.  We
assume an uncompensated elasticity of 0.05 for the primary earner and 0.4 for the
secondary earner, which implies a compensated elasticity of 0.075 for the primary earner
and 0.6 for the secondary earner.
Household Food Expenditures
To the extent that farm commodity programs lower farm commodity prices, and
these lower prices are passed onto consumers as lower food prices after processing, there
is a social benefit to domestic consumers to the farm programs.  The benefit to consumers
is an aspect of the distributional analysis of farm commodity programs.  Our measure of
household well-being is a real income measure, which accounts for the benefits from
price changes to food. We calculate the benefit as the base year food consumption
multiplied by the difference between the new and old price.
We do not expect a commodity price impact from farm commodity programs that
are lump-sum transfers, but market-distorting subsidies will have an impact on program
commodity prices.  The marketing loan program will reduce the market price paid for the
program commodities.  To the extent that counter-cyclical payments are market
distorting, they will also reduce the market price for program commodities.
Food purchased for home consumption (excluding alcohol) amounted to 7.4
percent of personal consumption expenditures in 2001 ($516 billion of $6,987 billion).
Adding food consumed away from home ($350 billion), the food expenditure share rises
to 12.4 percent of total expenditures.  In our calculation of this benefit, we focus on food
consumed at home.  The food expenditure share varies by household income.  According
to published data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey for 2001, the food expenditure
share (at home) is 11.3 percent for the lowest 20 percent of households and 5.9 percent
for the highest 20 percent of households (USDL-BLS, CEX).
The farm value share of retail food expenditures is on average 20 percent. If other
prices remain constant and farm prices fall by 1 percent, then food prices will fall by 0.2
percent assuming that input price changes are passed through as changes in the price of
final products.  In perfectly competitive industry, as in our model, these cost-based price
adjustments occur.  So a 1 percent farm price change will result in a $1 billion change in
the cost of food consumption at home, given $516 billion of total food consumption.15
Scenarios and Results
We analyze the economy-wide distributional impacts from removing three major
farm commodity programs governed by the 2002 Farm Act; direct payments, counter-
cyclical payments, and marketing assistance loans.  The distributional impacts depend on
whether the programs are lump-sum transfers, or market-distorting subsidies.  In
scenario-1, counter-cyclical payments are combined with direct payments as a lump-sum
transfer, while marketing assistance loans are treated as a market-distorting subsidy.  In
scenario-2, counter-cyclical payments are combined with marketing assistance loans as a
market-distorting subsidy, while direct payments are treated as a lump-sum transfer.
Table 7 presents the annual average expenditures for the two types of programs for the
two scenarios, using projected program expenditure data from table 1.
The  distributional effects from removing the farm commodity programs are
among farm households, low-income non-farm households and high-income non-farm
households, and among the farm household types distinguished by the USDA-ERS
typology.  Farm household impacts occur through program effects on household income,
farm sector output, and commodity prices.  Non-farm household impacts occur through
taxes and the cost of food.  In both scenarios, the reduction in government expenditures is
budget neutral with an off-setting proportional reduction in the personal income tax rate.
Furthermore, removal of U.S. farm programs are done unilaterally, in that, the farm
programs of other countries remain in place.
Scenario-1: With counter-cyclical payments treated as lump-sum transfer
With scenario-1, we assess the distributional impacts of removing the farm
commodity programs with counter-cyclical payments treated as a lump-sum transfer. In
this scenario, Lump-sum transfers account for 85 percent of farm commodity program
expenditures, while the market-distorting subsidies account for 15 percent of program
expenditures (Table 7).  Of total farm program payments removed, 73 percent are taken
from farm households (-$8.170 million), with the remaining 27 percent are taken from
non-operator landlords as a reduction in rents (Table 8).
Given the endogenous labor supply response to the tax reduction and to the
reduction in lump-sum transfers and market distorting subsidies to farm households, the
farm operator and spouse reduce their on-farm labor supply by 3,800 jobs (0.2 percent),
but increase their off-farm labor supply by 16,100 jobs (table 8).
11  There is a small shift
of on-farm labor to off-farm labor due to the removal of a small market distorting
subsidy.  The larger off-farm labor supply response of farm households is from a
reduction in leisure in response to the loss of an income transfer and an increase in the
wage net of taxes.  In a sense, the farm household attempts to maintain their income after
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the loss of the transfer by working more, but there is an implicit cost to working more in
the reduction of leisure.  Even though farm households work more, there is a reduction in
earnings (-$354 million), which occurs for two reasons.  First, the on-farm net wage falls
as the sector loses market-distorting subsidies and as tax rates are reduced.  Second, the
off-farm wage that farm households earn is assumed to be lower than the on-farm wage.
We assume that the on-farm wage is the economy-wide average wage and that the off-
farm wage is that of the low-skilled occupation, which is lower than the average wage.
The specification of the on- and off-farm wages for farm households needs more
empirical investigation.
The high-income households increase their labor supply response by the
equivalent of 54,000 jobs (Table 8).  Labor supply responds primarily to a reduction in
tax rates, but also to a reduction in rents (including farm program payments) paid to non-
operator landlords.  This raises a question of whether the rents will fall by the amount of
loss in farm program payments that were formally paid to non-operator landlords.  In our
analysis, they do.
The change to the cost of food consumption is in the last column to table 8.  The
magnitude is small for all households because the commodity price changes are small.
The price changes are small because most of the farm program payments are treated as
lump-sum transfers in this scenario, which do not distort commodity prices.  Only the
$1,700 million of marketing loan gains distort farm commodity prices.  Removing the
programs increases an aggregate crop price index by 0.38 percent, processed food price
index by 0.18 percent and the CPI for food by 0.03 percent (Table 9).
Net income, our measure of household well-being, includes all sources of income
net of taxes and is adjusted for price changes.  Net income equals personal consumption
plus savings adjusted for price changes.  Net income falls by $6,881 million for farm
households, which is 84 percent of the farm program payments received by farm
households (Table 8).  Due to adjustments in other sources of income, personal income
tax, and consumer prices the fall in net income is less than the reduction in farm program
payments.
The net income for high-income households increases by $9,579 million (Table
8).  The increase in well-being is primarily due to a reduction the personal income tax,
but also due to an increase in labor income.  The figure is positive despite a loss in farm
program payments that were received as a part of rents paid to non-operator landlords.
This policy scenario has little impact on low-income non-farm households.  The small
reduction in labor income is due to a small fall in wages as the labor market adjusts to an
increase in labor supply by farm households and high-income households, and due to a
small reduction in labor supply in response to the fall in wage.
For all households net income increases by $2,676 (Table 8).  The economy-wide
outcome reflects both an increase in net income to high-income households, who pay less
taxes and increase labor supply in response to a reduction in tax rates, and a reduction in
net income to farm households as they lose transfer payments.  The change in the cost of17
food consumption turns out to be a small contribution to the overall outcome, since the
commodity price distortions from the farm programs were small under this scenario.  The
efficiency cost of taxes used for farm commodity programs is 24 percent, measured as the
change in net income relative to the reduction in farm program payments.  This figure
means that for every $1 billion of farm program payments transferred to the agricultural
sector, net income economy-wide is reduced by $240 million due to economic
inefficiency.
Among farm households, the direct loss of income from removal of farm
commodity programs is 3.4, 6.5, and 9.6 times larger per farm for the three largest farm
household types than the average loss per farm among all farm households.  Those ratios
correspond to the distribution of farm program payments.  The reduction in net income
follows the same pattern among farm households.  The labor supply response does not
follow the same distributions.  The three largest farm household types slightly increase
their on-farm labor, whereas the other farm household types decrease their on-farm labor.
The largest reduction in labor supply is by residential farm households, which have the
largest number of farm households.  All farm household types increase their off-farm
labor supply.  The off-farm labor supply response reflects the loss of transfer income
from both coupled and decoupled programs.
Producer impacts are presented in table 9.  There are two sets of outcomes in
these results.  One set involves the agricultural sectors’ response to the removal of the
farm program payments.  The other set involves the non-farm sectors’ response to the
increased income to high-income households and their expansion of labor supply.  For
this paper, we discuss a few of the agricultural sector outcomes.  Farm prices rise for the
major crops for which the marketing loan gains are important, such as food grains (6.1
percent from the base), cotton (1.85 percent), and oilseeds (1.28 percent). Associated
with the price increases for these crops are a reduction in production, jobs, and exports,
such that total crop production falls by $955 million and total crop exports fall by $842
million.  The loss of 11,400 jobs in the farm sector is a combination of job equivalents for
farm operators and hired farm workers.  Value added, which does not include program
payments, falls in proportion to production as a share of the cost to production.  By
definition, sector income equals value added plus both market distorting subsidies and
lump-sum payments to the sector, less indirect tax.  Consequently, it falls due to the
reductions in both value added and program payments.
Even though feed crops received marketing loan gains, when they are removed
prices fall slightly and production rises slightly, contrary to a price increase and reduction
in production for other crops that received marketing loan gains (Table 9).  A reason for
this contrary result is related to the use of feed crops (which includes hay).  Exports are a
smaller share of total crop production for feed crops than for the other program crops.
They are primarily used as feed for domestic livestock production.  Domestic demand for
meat products is less elastic than foreign demand for feed crops.  All these demand
factors lead to a smaller response by feed crops than the other program crops. With
cropland from other program crops available for alternative uses, some land moves into
feed crop production increasing supply and lowering price.18
Scenario-2: With counter-cyclical payments treated as market-distorting subsidy
Under scenario-2, we assess the distributional impacts of removing the farm
commodity programs with counter-cyclical payments treated as a market-distorting
subsidy.  Lump-sum transfers now account for 44 percent of farm commodity program
expenditures, while the market-distorting subsidies account for 56 percent of program
expenditures (Table 7).  Distorting subsidies are 3.7 times greater in scenario-2 than in
scenario-1.  As with scenario-1, only 73 percent of the farm program payments are
received by the farm households and the other 27 percent are received by non-operator
landlords as a portion of the rents paid to non-operator landlords (Table 10).
Given the endogenous labor supply response to the tax reduction and to the
reduction in lump-sum transfers and market distorting subsidies to farm households, farm
operators and their spouses reduce their on-farm labor supply by 18,000 jobs (0.8
percent), but increase their off-farm labor supply by 21,500 jobs (table 10).
12  Because
the market distorting subsidies are greater in this scenario than in the previous one, there
is a greater reduction of on-farm operator and spouse labor supply.  The operator and
spouse shift their labor supply to off-farm jobs.  Still, the increase in off-farm labor
supply is greater than the decrease in on-farm labor supply due to a reduction in leisure in
response to the loss of the income transfer.  Relative to scenario-1, the reduction in on-
farm labor supply is greater and more evenly matched with the increase in off-farm labor
supply in scenario-2 due to the greater use of distorting subsidies.
In their labor supply response to the policy change, farm households attempt to
maintain their net income after the loss of the transfer income by working more, but there
is an implicit cost to working more in the reduction of leisure.  Even though farm
households work more, there is a reduction in earnings (-$1,300 million), which occurs
for the same reasons as in scenario-1.  The farmer wage falls more in scenario-2 due to
removal of larger market distorting subsidies, leading to a larger reduction in earnings.
The high-income households increase their labor supply response by the
equivalent of 48,000 jobs (Table 10).  The labor supply response is slightly lower but
comparable to the response in scenario-1, a result that is expected given that the policy
change for them is similar.  Taxes paid are lower with a reduction in tax rates, but as non-
operator landlords, the rents (including farm program payments) received from the farm
sector are also lower.  Relative to scenario-1, the reduction in tax payments in scenario-2
is small (by $350 million) due to larger economy-wide adjustments in other tax revenues
and cost of government expenditures.   The removal of larger market-distorting subsidies
leads to larger price adjustments and changes in the tax base for other sources of
government revenue.
Food consumption costs increase by $747 million (table 10).  Removal of larger
market distorting subsidies in scenario-2 compared to scenario-1 leads to larger
commodity price increases.  Removing farm programs increases an aggregate crop price
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index by 1.85 percent and a processed food price index by 0.67 percent (Table 11). A
food CPI increases by 0.17 percent (not reported).  The increase in prices from removal
of market-distorting programs implies that these programs lower commodity prices and
food costs, which benefit consumers.  Most of the food cost adjustment falls on high-
income households who consume a greater share of food in our household aggregation.
Net income to farm households falls by $6,344 million, which is 77 percent of the
farm program payments received by farm households (Table 10).  The loss in net income
is smaller by $540 million in scenario-2 than in scenario-1.  The net income for high-
income households increases by $9,343 million (Table 10).  The gain in net income is
smaller by $240 million in scenario-2 than in scenario-1.  Overall, household net income
increases by $2,954 (Table 10), which is $278 million larger than the overall increase in
net income in scenario-1. The efficiency cost of taxes is 26 percent, measured as the
change in net income relative to the reduction in farm program payments, slightly higher
than in scenario-1.  Larger market-distorting program payments in scenario-2 leads to
larger efficiency costs and larger economy-wide welfare gains from their reduction.
Among farm households, the direct loss of income from removal of farm
commodity programs is the same as in scenario-1, which is equivalent to the distribution
of farm program payments.  The distribution of the impact on net income also follows the
distribution of the program payments that were removed, as in scenario-1.  The
distribution of on-farm labor supply response is different than scenario-1, while the
distribution of off-farm labor supply is the same.  The reason for the same distribution of
off-farm labor supply response is that in both scenarios off-farm labor supply is
responding to a loss of income from removal of all program payments, which is the same
in both scenarios.  It does not matter if the program payments are coupled or decoupled
for the off-farm labor supply response.  The difference occurs in the on-farm labor supply
response.  The reduction in total on-farm labor supply is larger in scenario-2, in which
more payments are coupled, than in scenario-1.  Coupled program payments distort the
on-farm labor supply decisions of farmers.  A reduction in on-farm labor supply by all
farm household types in scenario-2 is more evenly matched by an increase in off-farm
labor supply by all farm household types.  With larger decoupled payments in scenario-1,
the on-farm labor supply for the three largest farm household types increase as they also
increase off-farm labor supply and decrease leisure, whereas the other farm household
types decrease their on-farm labor supply as they increase their off-farm labor supply
leaving leisure less effected.  The larger farm household types have a greater opportunity
to shift on-farm labor out of program crops and into other production activities.
Producer impacts are presented in table 11. We discuss a few of the agricultural
sector outcomes.  Farm prices rise for the major crops for which the marketing loan gains
are important, such as food grains (13 percent), cotton (12.6 percent), and oilseeds (3
percent). Associated with the price increases for these crops is a reduction in demand that
leads to a reduction total crop production by $2,733 million.  The fall in production is
almost completely absorbed by a $2,382 million reduction in exports, illustrating the
importance of exports to these program crops. The loss of 40,500 jobs in the farm sector
is a combination of job equivalents for farm operators and hired farm workers.  Some20
farm operators shift their work from crops to livestock increasing employment (details on
jobs by occupation are not reported), still, there is a reduction in livestock production as
hired labor and capital stocks decrease in the livestock sectors.  As in scenario-1, feed
crops respond differently than other program crops.  Prices rise, but only by 2 percent,
and production falls but by less than other program crops (Table 11).
Given the importance of exports to program crops, we experimented with
reducing the trade elasticity values by half in scenario-2, from 2 to 1.  Farm commodity
price increased more (16 percent compared to 13 percent for food grains), while crop
exports fell only two-thirds as much.  Farm households reduced their on-farm labor
supply by 12,000 compared to 18,000 and increased their off-farm labor supply by
16,300.  For all households, the change in food costs was doubled, and the efficiency cost
of taxation was reduced from 26 percent to 19 percent.  This experiment illustrates that
the efficiency cost of taxation for government programs that affect the price of exported
commodities depends on the responsiveness of exports to price changes.
Summary and future research developments
Integrating farm and non-farm households into the U.S. CGE model and its
underlying database has been a major undertaking.  The results from our analysis suggest
how farm and non-farm households might respond to removal of farm commodity
programs in a unilateral setting and how this response depends on whether the programs
are coupled or decoupled.
Summary of Results by Comparison of Scenarios
A comparison of the distributional results between the two scenarios illustrates
the relative impact of coupled versus decoupled farm commodity programs on household
well-being and on their labor market participation.  In both scenarios the same total
amount of program payments are removed ($11,200 million).  In scenario-1, counter-
cyclical payments are treated as  decoupled, while in scenario-2 they are treated as a
coupled payment. Net income is our measure of household well-being.  The loss in net
income for farm households is larger by $540 million under scenario-1. For the non-farm
households the gains in net income from removing the programs are larger by $260
million under scenario-1.  For all households, the increase in net income from removal of
the programs is smaller by $280 million in scenario-1. Conducting the scenarios in
reverse, that is, adding farm commodity programs to a model that initially excludes them,
the results from our analysis suggest that decoupled payments are of greater benefit to
farm households than coupled payments, but that decoupled payments cost the non-farm
households more than coupled payments.  The net result for all households is that the use
of farm commodity programs as a means of redistribution has a social cost, which is $280
million less with greater use of decoupled payments (scenario-1).21
A reason for the difference between the two scenarios in the change in household
net income is the impact on commodity prices and how this affects food costs. Market-
distorting coupled programs lower commodity prices.  The removal of program payments
increases food costs more under scenario-2 than scenario-1, because the market-distorting
programs are larger under scenario-2.  The implication is that larger coupled payments, as
in scenario-2, lower food costs, which is a benefit to non-farm households.
Another reason for the difference in the change in net income is the impact of
coupled and decoupled payments on labor supply.   The change in off-farm labor supply
by all households is essentially the same for the two scenarios, at 69,000 jobs.  The
reason for this similarity is that the off-farm labor supply response is driven by the
change in transfer income to farmers and the change in net wage to the taxpayers, which
are the same in each scenario.  A difference in labor supply response between these two
scenarios involves on-farm labor supply.  Coupled payments affect on-farm labor supply
more than the decoupled payments because they increase agricultural production.  When
farm households receive coupled payments (instead of no payments), they shift labor
from off-farm to on-farm jobs.  When they receive decoupled payments (instead of no
payments), farm households maintain farm jobs and shift from off-farm jobs to leisure.
Among farm households, the distribution of the impact on net income follows the
distribution of program payments that were removed in both scenarios.  The distribution
of off-farm labor supply response is also similar under the two scenarios. The driving
force for these similar results is the identical loss of transfer income.   A difference in the
distributional impacts among farm households occurs with their on-farm labor supply
response.  All farm household types reduce their on-farm labor supply in response to the
removal of the larger coupled payments in scenario-2.  When counter-cyclical payments
are treated as decouled (scenario-1), the three largest farm household types increase their
on-farm labor supply, while the other farm household types decrease their on-farm labor
supply.  Under scenario-1 there is less reduction in total on-farm labor supply compared
to scenario-2, and there is some shifting of on-farm labor supply into alternative farm
production activities such as livestock, which allows for the small increase in on-farm
labor supply by the three largest farm household types.
Future Research Developments
We plan to update the SAM database underlying the model and analysis.  The U.S.
Benchmark Input-Output Accounts for 1997 will be updated to a more recent year and
combined with micro-survey data on household income, labor force characteristics, and
expenditures into a SAM database.  Current Population Survey data will be used for non-
farm households and ARMS data will be used for farm households.  We will consider
using a technique to reconcile household survey data with National Accounts Data that
adjust population weights for data consistency (Robilliard and Robinson 1999).22
We plan to improve specification of the farm households’ on- and off-farm labor
supply responses to off-farm wages, farm earnings, and other income changes.  Special
attention can be given to the on- and off-farm wage for the farm operator and spouse, and
their joint labor supply decisions.  We hope to use future econometric analysis of ARMS
data for this issue (Ahearn, El-Osta, Dewbre 2002, Dewbre and Mishra 2002).  We will
also consider integrating a microsimulation model of farm household labor supply with
the CGE model as in Cogneau and Robilliard (2000).
We plan to introduce additional farm programs into the model.  A likely direction for
futrue work is to model import policies by the United States and by foreign countries on
agricultural and textile commodities.  We plan to use the database developed by Gibson,
Wainio, Whitley, and Bohman (2001) to specify world export and import price wedges
by commodity.  We also plan to model the impact of dairy programs on the price and
supply of dairy products.
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Table 1: Commodity Program Average Annual Expenditures, 2003-06 Projections, $ Million
a
Cotton Wheat Rice Corn Soybeans Peanuts Sum
Sum 1,631 2,348 1,303 3,967 1,654 292 11,195
Direct payments 582 1,147 400 1,984 728 65 4,906
Counter-cyclical payments 890 940 306 1,725 567 172 4,600
Loan deficiency payments 159 261 597 258 359 55 1,689
a. Source: preliminary USDA-ERS projections, March 3, 200330
Table 2: Farm Income Statement by Farm Household Type
a
limited retirement residential lower higher large very large
resource lifestyle sales sales family farms family farms farms
Farm households, number 126,920 297,566 931,561 480,441 175,370 77,314 58,403 2,147,576
Farm households, percent distribution 5.9 13.9 43.4 22.4 8.2 3.6 2.7 100.0
Farm households below poverty, percent 55.0 10.7 3.0 21.6 18.4 17.0 14.9 13.4
Farm hh. elderly operator (+65), percent 47.2 70.5 5.0 39.4 13.0 7.9 9.1 25.4
Gross cash income, dollars per farm
b
7,838 9,456 12,969 34,252 160,621 321,084 989,377 66,643
Gross cash income, percent distribution 0.7 2.0 8.4 11.5 19.7 17.3 40.4 100.0
 Less: Expenses 11,447 10,876 17,310 35,624 136,204 274,261 829,955 61,228
 Equals farm self-employment income -3,609 -1,420 -4,341 -1,372 24,417 46,823 159,422 5,415
 Plus other farm-related earnimgs
c
29 72 334 1,244 2,284 4,264 6,212 944
 Equals farm self-employment income adj. -3,580 -1,348 -4,007 -128 26,701 51,087 165,634 6,359
 Plus off-farm sources of income 13,114 41,991 87,796 39,892 26,621 34,598 35,572 57,988
     Wages and salaries 4,791 8,700 59,495 17,036 16,248 18,156 16,661 33,541
     Off-farm business income 1,067 2,554 20,448 5,349 2,945 5,864 6,699 11,117
     Interest and dividends 899 6,956 4,088 3,787 3,242 4,640 7,349 4,269
     Public programs, inc. Social Security 5,692 16,961 1,638 8,282 2,379 1,724 1,410 5,545
     Other passive sources of income
d
0 6,819 2,126 5,438 1,807 4,214 3,452 3,516
                             
 Equals average farm household income 9,534 40,643 83,788 39,764 53,322 85,685 201,206 64,347
 Plus non-money income
e 
2,337 5,767 5,611 5,142 4,952 5,395 5,158 5,261
 Equals average farm household income adj. 11,871 46,410 89,399 44,906 58,274 91,080 206,364 69,608
Farm self-emp, percent share of farm hh inc. -30.2 -2.9 -4.5 -0.3 45.8 56.1 80.3
Off-farm inc, percent share of farm hh inc. 110.5 90.5 98.2 88.8 45.7 38.0 17.2 83.3
Off-farm earnings, percent share of farm hh inc.  49.3 24.2 89.4 49.8 32.9 26.4 11.3 64.2
a. Source: USDA-ERS, 1999 Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS). 
b. Cash receipts, government payments, income from machine hire, custom work, livestock grazing, land rental, contract production fees, outdoor recreation.
c. Net income from another farm, wages paid to other operator household memebers, and commodities paid to household members.
d. An undefined residual category of income.
e. Includes value of home consumption plus imputed rental value of farm dwellings.31
Table 3. Government program payment shares by farm household type, percent distribution
a
limited retirement residential lower higher large very large        all
resource lifestyle sales sales family farms family farms    farms
all govt. programs, $ per farm 1,127 1,666 1,407 4,604 21,993 41,033 58,650
Percent distribution by farm type:
  all govt. programs 0.98 3.39 8.97 15.13 26.39 21.70 23.43    100
  Agricultural disaster payments 0.77 2.35 7.57 18.99 27.96 20.89 21.50    100
  Loan deficiency payments 0.82 1.03 7.25 12.04 27.11 24.84 26.91    100
  Production flexibility payments 0.66 1.31 6.80 14.09 28.07 23.28 25.81    100
  Conservation program 3.78 23.53 26.86 21.91 12.39 6.51 5.04    100
a. Source: USDA-ERS, 1999 Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS).32
Table 4: Farm Value of Production, Household Share of Each Product Category, Percent
a
limited retirement residential lower higher large very large all
resource lifestyle sales sales family farms family farms farms
Dairy 0.32 0.23 0.76 5.72 25.65 16.64 50.70 100
Poultry 0.00 0.00 1.51 0.44 9.76 13.34 74.83 100
Livestock 1.09 2.73 11.36 12.99 13.81 13.39 44.64 100
Cotton 0.59 0.00 1.83 3.34 18.30 23.36 52.47 100
Food grains 0.71 0.93 4.21 14.04 29.23 24.92 25.23  99
Feed grains 0.68 2.35 11.11 14.19 26.06 22.43 23.14 100
Oilseeds 0.71 0.95 8.72 13.24 27.49 26.01 22.89 100
Fruit & vege 0.32 1.19 5.66 7.33 10.02 10.58 64.86 100
Tobacco 2.25 3.13 15.12 24.23 25.62 14.41 15.22 100
Other crops 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 9.27 25.41 60.28  95
All crops 0.64 1.47 7.88 11.58 21.39 19.88 36.96 100
All livestock 0.59 1.31 5.79 7.66 16.10 14.30 54.24 100
All production 0.61 1.38 6.72 9.41 18.47 16.79 46.52 100
a. Source: USDA-ERS, 1999 Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS).  The percent by farm
household types does not always sum to 100 percent due to disclosure limitations and rounding.33
Table 5. Farm Value of Production, Product Shares for Each Household Type, Percent
a
limited retirement residential lower higher large very large all
resource lifestyle sales sales family farms family farms farms
Dairy 8.11 2.60 1.77 9.51 21.74 15.51 17.06 15.66
Poultry 0.00 0.00 3.25 0.68 7.63 11.47 23.23 14.44
Livestock 44.86 49.75 42.60 34.81 18.86 20.11 24.20 25.22
Cotton 2.98 0.00 0.84 1.10 3.06 4.30 3.49 3.09
Food grains 4.73 2.75 2.56 6.10 6.47 6.07 2.22 4.09
Feed grains 15.91 24.21 23.52 21.47 20.09 19.01 7.08 14.23
Oilseeds 9.63 5.67 10.73 11.64 12.31 12.81 4.07 8.27
Fruit & vege 6.28 10.40 10.15 9.39 6.54 7.59 16.80 12.05
Tobacco 7.51 4.62 4.59 5.25 2.83 1.75 0.67 2.04
Other crops 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.46 1.38 1.18 0.91
All crops 47.03 47.65 52.38 54.99 51.76 52.91 35.51 44.69
All livestock 52.97 52.35 47.62 45.01 48.24 47.09 64.49 55.31
All production 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
a. Source: USDA-ERS, 1999 Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS).34
Table 6: Operator Farm and Off-Farm Labor Supply, Number
a
limited retirement residential lower higher large very large all
resource lifestyle sales sales family farms family farms farms
Operator
  On-farm work 126,920 297,566 931,561 480,441 175,370 77,314 58,403 2,147,576
    full-time 22,084 25,293 49,373 246,466 154,150 67,882 49,759 637,830
    part-time 104,836 272,273 882,188 233,975 21,220 9,432 8,644 1,509,746
  Off-farm work 36,680 33,030 877,530 152,780 45,947 17,705 9,987 1,163,986
    full-time 24,686 15,326 778,370 78,071 25,455 10,180 4,624 930,025
    part-time 11,994 17,704 99,161 74,710 20,492 7,525 5,363 233,961
  No off-farm
work
90,240 264,536 54,031 327,661 129,423 59,609 48,416 983,590
Spouse
  On-farm work
    full-time
b 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
    part-time 75,302 243,320 821,637 413,948 150,976 71,423 51,412 1,828,017
  Off-farm work 10,166 45,987 492,160 159,370 72,167 33,712 20,256 809,811
    full-time 6,770 29,846 360,754 110,762 43,805 20,092 13,146 567,678
    part-time 3,395 16,142 131,407 48,608 28,361 13,619 7,110 242,134
    no work 65,136 197,332 329,476 254,578 78,809 37,711 31,156 1,018,205
a. Source: USDA-ERS, Agricultural Resource Management Study (ARMS), various years.
b. Data not in the 1999 ARMS, but in subsequent surveys.  Future analysis will include this data.35
Table 7: Scenario Treatment of Farm Commodity Programs Expenditures
a
Scenario-1 Scenario-2
                billion $
Lump-sum transfer 9.5 4.9
Distorting subsidy 1.7 6.3
Total program exp. 11.2 11.2
                percent
Lump-sum transfer 84.8 43.8
Distorting subsidy 15.2 56.3
a. Source: preliminary USDA-ERS projections, March 3, 200336
Table 8: Household Impacts for Scenario-1 Counter-Cyclical as Lump-Sum Transfer
with results reported as differences from the base
households farm prog income labor net farm non-farm cost of food
(base value) payments tax income income labor supply labor supply consumption
thous. mil $ (real) mil $ (real) mil $ (real) mil $ (real) thous. jobs thous. jobs mil $ (nom.)
Total households 110,976 -11,224 -11,670 404 2,676 -3.8 69.7 128
  Farm households 2,148 -8,170 -1,097 -354 -6,881 -3.8 16.1
  Low-income households 23,321 -9 -23 -36 -21 -0.1 12
  High-income households 85,508 -3,045 -10,551 793 9,579 53.7 111
Farm households 2,148 -8,170 -1,097 -354 -6,881 -3.8 16.1
  Limited resource 127 -54 -10 -6 -47 -0.1 0.1
  Retirement 298 -109 -41 -62 -123 -0.7 0.5
  Residential lifestyle 932 -553 -279 -155 -397 -3.1 5.8
  Farm occup., Low sales 480 -1,137 -186 -74 -954 -0.8 2.6
  Farm occup., high sales 175 -2,280 -216 -6 -1,915 0.4 2.7
  Large family 77 -1,916 -160 -1 -1,616 0.4 2.0
  Very large family 58 -2,122 -204 -49 -1,830 0.1 2.437
Table 9: Producer Impacts for Scenario-1 Counter-Cyclical as Lump-Sum Transfer
with results reported as differences from the base
Jobs Production Exports Imports Value added Sector income Prod. Price
thous. mil $ (real) mil $ (real) mil $ (real) mil $ (nom.) mil $ (nom.) % change
Total 63.9 5,268 -28 -65 2,038 -9,367 0.00
Farm -11.4 -915 -839 0 -304 -11,508 0.16
Food processing 0.2 -169 -115 32 -35 -40 0.18
Energy 1.6 424 15 -23 206 183 0.01
Construction 1.4 91 0 0 -70 -70 -0.02
Trade and transportation 12.8 747 -186 3 152 123 -0.02
Tobacco and alcohol 0.1 26 19 -4 16 14 -0.03
Apparel 0.8 52 1 29 8 7 0.06
Non-durable MFG 2.7 479 133 -32 184 179 0.00
Durable MFG 13.1 1,923 788 -68 646 633 -0.01
Housing and finance 6.3 858 53 -1 696 595 0.00
Restaurant 3.1 78 14 0 -17 -20 -0.01
Health services 9.6 611 2 0 330 327 -0.01
Education 1.9 86 18 0 37 37 -0.02
Other services 21.8 975 67 -1 190 173 -0.02
Total farm -11.4 -915 -839 0 -304 -11,508 0.16
  Livestock aggregate 2.0 39 2 -2 -150 -148 -0.11
    Dairy 0.1 4 0 0 -38 -37 -0.18
    Poultry 0.2 -4 0 0 -26 -26 0.16
    Livestock 1.7 39 3 -2 -86 -84 -0.16
  Crop aggregate -13.4 -955 -842 1 -155 -11,360 0.38
    Cotton -1.5 -120 -109 3 36 -1,597 1.85
    Food grains -7.1 -592 -542 26 200 -3,463 6.10
    Feed crops 0.1 58 46 -2 -65 -4,031 -0.24
    Oilseeds -4.8 -389 -273 5 -52 -2,000 1.28
    Other crops 0.0 88 37 -30 -273 -269 -0.6738
Table 10: Household Impacts for Scenario-2 Counter-Cyclical as Distorting Subsidy
with results reported as differences from the base
households farm prog income labor net farm non-farm cost of food
(base value) payments tax income income labor supply labor supply consumption
thous. mil $ (real) mil $ (real) mil $ (real) mil $ (real) thous. jobs thous. jobs mil $ (nom.)
Total households 110,976 -11,268 -11,268 -1,144 2,954 -17.9 69.2 747
  Farm households 2,148 -8,203 -1,049 -1,307 -6,344 -17.9 21.5 29
  Low-income households 23,321 -9 -23 -69 -45 -0.3 107
  High-income households 85,508 -3,057 -10,197 232 9,343 48.0 610
Farm households 2,148 -8,203 -1,049 -1,307 -6,344 -17.9 21.5
  Limited resource 127 -55 -10 -18 -48 -0.2 0.2
  Retirement 298 -107 -51 -151 -177 -1.9 1.0
  Residential lifestyle 932 -554 -301 -444 -553 -7.9 8.6
  Farm occup., Low sales 480 -1,063 -174 -249 -880 -3.4 3.5
  Farm occup., high sales 175 -2,208 -183 -135 -1,594 -1.4 3.0
  Large family 77 -1,946 -138 -92 -1,377 -0.9 2.2
  Very large family 58 -2,270 -191 -218 -1,715 -2.2 3.039
Table 11: Producer Impacts for Scenario-2 Counter-Cyclical as Distorting Subsidy
with results reported as differences from the base
Jobs Production Exports Imports Value added Sector income Prod. Price
thous. mil $ (real) mil $ (real) mil $ (real) mil $ (nom.) mil $ (nom.) % change
Total 47.3 6,494 -533 -564 414 -10,884 0.00
Farm -40.5 -2,853 -2,390 17 194 -11,076 1.32
Food processing -1.6 -770 -451 125 -201 -216 0.67
Energy 1.8 631 39 -169 163 141 -0.03
Construction 1.4 110 0 0 -235 -233 -0.05
Trade and transportation 13.1 830 -444 -2 -473 -395 -0.07
Tobacco and alcohol 0.2 81 60 -11 23 20 -0.09
Apparel -4.2 -436 -178 156 -192 -194 0.40
Non-durable MFG 0.3 755 349 -179 94 91 -0.04
Durable MFG 28.2 4,588 2,125 -491 1,380 1,352 -0.04
Housing and finance 7.2 1,376 149 -3 113 94 -0.05
Restaurant 3.4 87 23 0 -94 -102 0.02
Health services 10.8 706 4 0 188 186 -0.05
Education 2.3 112 35 -1 31 31 -0.06
Other services 24.9 1,276 144 -7 -577 -583 -0.07
Total farm -40.5 -2,853 -2,390 17 194 -11,076 1.32
  Livestock aggregate 2.3 -119 -8 4 -378 -385 0.68
    Dairy 0.1 -10 0 0 -89 -89 0.82
    Poultry 0.3 -20 -2 0 -63 -63 0.71
    Livestock 1.9 -89 -6 4 -227 -233 0.63
  Crop aggregate -42.8 -2,733 -2,382 13 572 -10,691 1.85
    Cotton -8.1 -611 -579 17 293 -1,350 12.59
    Food grains -14.1 -1,061 -988 54 495 -3,186 12.98
    Feed crops -7.5 -352 -277 10 635 -3,362 1.93
    Oilseeds -12.5 -928 -634 11 -134 -2,086 3.09
    Other crops -0.6 219 96 -79 -717 -707 -1.74